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From a Muddle to a Mudslide:  
Murr v. Wisconsin
Nicole Stelle Garnett*
Murr v. Wisconsin was not an easy case, but it was a straightfor-
ward one. That is, the answer to the question presented in the case 
was not self-evident, but the question itself was not complicated. 
Murr was a so-called “regulatory takings” case. The Fifth Amend-
ment’s Takings Clause provides “nor shall private property be taken 
for public purposes without just compensation.” Compensation is 
always required when the government uses the power of eminent 
domain to take property for public uses. But in a line of cases dat-
ing to the early 20th century, the Court also has held that property 
regulations that go “too far” are tantamount to takings and require 
compensation.1 
The regulatory takings doctrine seeks to articulate the line be-
tween the vast universe of constitutionally permissible regulations 
restricting the use of private property, many of which impose finan-
cial burdens on property owners, and regulatory outliers that im-
pose burdens so severe that the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause 
requires the government to compensate the owners for their losses. 
The protection provided by the Takings Clause is not robust. As 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist once said, he saw no reason why 
the Takings Clause, “as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First 
Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the sta-
tus of a poor relation.”2 Murr proved no exception. Indeed, it further 
undermined the already enfeebled constitutional rights enjoyed by 
property owners against regulatory excess. 
*John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
2  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
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In Murr, the Court squarely confronted tension inherent in the 
Court’s regulatory takings canon. On one hand, the Court has long 
insisted that state laws define the contours of property rights.3 On the 
other, it also has admonished that state laws that impose particularly 
harsh burdens on property owners for other than traditional health 
and safety reasons will be treated as takings for which the regulated 
property owners are entitled to compensation.4 These two ideas are 
not easily reconciled. If state laws define the contours of property 
rights, it is reasonable to ask why state laws that restructure those 
contours—restricting or reshaping property rights—ought ever be 
considered compensable takings. In other words, if states have the 
power to define what property is, why can’t they redefine what it is 
without compensating property owners? Conversely, giving states 
carte blanche to regulate away all the value of private property would 
render the protection provided by the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause a dead letter. 
Murr illustrates this conundrum. The Murrs, four siblings, re-
ceived as a gift title to two adjoining lots on the St. Croix River that 
their parents had purchased at separate times in the 1960s. The par-
ents built a cabin on one and kept the other as an investment prop-
erty. The two lots have always been deeded and taxed separately, 
and remain so to the present.
But in 1975, a local zoning ordinance combined the lots. The ef-
fect, as the Murrs discovered in 2004 when they sought to sell the 
investment lot (valued at $410,000), was to prohibit them from doing 
so unless they sold the other lot and cabin with it. They argued that 
the law preventing them from selling or developing the undevel-
oped parcel effected a regulatory taking of their property, since it 
extinguished rights their parents had enjoyed. The Supreme Court 
disagreed on the ground that the economic impact of the regulation 
should be measured not by treating the lots separately but by consid-
ering them together. This conclusion sealed the Murrs’ fate, since the 
total value of the lots together was only slightly lower than the two 
lots valued separately. 
3  Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1950 (2017) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) (“Our deci-
sions have, time and again, declared that the Takings Clause protects private property 
rights as state law creates and defines them.”).
4  Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
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Commentators have for years complained that the Supreme 
Court’s regulatory takings doctrine is an indeterminate muddle.5 
Murr need not have added to the confusion. The Court might rea-
sonably have held, based on the principle that state law defines the 
contours of property rights, that the merged lots were the relevant 
parcel for regulatory takings analysis. Alternatively, it might have 
held that property rights are not so malleable that the state can erase 
them simply because title changes hands. Unfortunately, the Murr 
decision does more than simply compound the confusion of takings 
law. In an effort to reconcile the tension between state laws as the 
source of property rights and the Takings Clause’s prohibition on 
regulatory takings, the majority took the opportunity not simply to 
answer the relatively straightforward question presented in Murr, 
but also to articulate a multifactor balancing test that seeks, for the 
first time, to define “property” as a matter of federal constitutional law. 
The factors in this new definition of property are not only subjec-
tive and malleable, but decidedly pro-government. As a result, the 
majority opinion transforms the “muddle” of regulatory takings law 
into a mudslide that threatens to undermine the very foundation of 
property rights. Thus, all property owners—not just the Murrs—lost 
in the litigation.
I. The Murrs’ Merger Problem
The petitioners in Murr were four siblings who had received as 
gifts from their parents two adjacent lots (given the sophisticated 
names “Lot E” and “Lot F”) along the St. Croix River in northwestern 
Wisconsin. The Murrs’ parents purchased Lot F in 1960 and placed 
the title in the name of Mr. Murr’s business, William Murr Plumb-
ing, Inc., on the advice of their accountant. Soon after purchasing the 
property, they built a small vacation cabin on Lot F. Three years later, 
they purchased the adjacent Lot E, planning eventually to develop 
or sell it. For whatever reason, they did neither. Lot E remains unde-
veloped to this day, although most of the other lots in the subdivi-
sion have been developed with homes, many of which are occupied 
by year-round residents. In 1994, the Murr parents transferred title to 
5  See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a 
Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561 (1984).
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Lot F and the cabin to their children as a gift. They transferred title 
to Lot E to the children the following year. 
A decade later, the Murr siblings began to explore the possibility 
of selling Lot E, valued at $410,000, to fund upgrades to the family 
cabin. At this point, they learned that they were no longer legally 
entitled to sell or develop Lot E unless they sold Lot F and the cabin 
with it. The reason was that state and county regulations enacted 
in 1975 include identical provisions that automatically “merge” con-
tiguous lots whenever they come under common ownership. Thus, 
Lots E and F were “merged” when the parents gave their children 
title to Lot F in 1995. These regulations also provide that lots merged 
under this provision “may not be sold or developed as separate lots” 
unless they have at least one acre of developable land. Unfortunately 
for the Murrs, Lot E does not. While the lot’s size is approximately 
1.25 acres, other regulations and topographical features restrict its 
developable space to less than an acre. 
The fact that they no longer had a right to sell or develop Lot E 
must have come as quite a shock to the Murrs. Although the govern-
ment claimed that the two lots had been legally “merged,” the Murrs 
never received any notice of this action. Moreover, they continued 
to hold separate title to the lots and pay separate tax bills for them. 
Their parents obviously had the right to transfer Lot E individually, 
since the Murr siblings received title to the lot in exactly such a trans-
fer. Moreover, the Murrs only had to look around the neighborhood 
to realize that their neighbors also had the right to develop and sell 
lots no bigger than Lot E, since most similar lots in the neighborhood 
are occupied by residences. 
Unfortunately for the Murrs, the “merger” regulations extin-
guished rights their neighbors continue to enjoy. Before the gifts to 
the Murr siblings, when the lots were owned separately (by the Murr 
parents and the plumbing company), a grandfather clause in the reg-
ulations permitted their separate sale and development—probably 
because the government was concerned that eliminating these rights 
might be unconstitutional. But upon receiving the gift of the adjacent 
lots, the siblings lost valuable rights enjoyed by their parents (and 
virtually all of their neighbors) because the state law “merged” the 
two separate, legally distinct, parcels.6 
6  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940–42. 
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The Murrs believed that the regulations extinguishing their rights 
to sell or develop Lot E separately from Lot F had confiscated their 
property rights, so they filed a regulatory takings action against the 
state of Wisconsin. Based upon prior precedent, they appeared to 
have a very strong case. Twenty-five years ago, in Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a developer 
in an almost identical situation. Mr. Lucas had purchased two beach-
front parcels in a high-end residential subdivision, intending to build 
a home for himself on one and a home to sell on the other. Before he 
could do so, South Carolina enacted a coastal preservation law that 
prevented construction of any “permanent habitable structure” on 
Mr. Lucas’s property, even though all the other lots in the subdivi-
sion had been developed with large homes.7 After finding that the 
prohibition rendered the regulated parcels “valueless,” a state trial 
court held that the regulation effected a taking. The South Carolina 
Supreme Court disagreed, holding instead that the regulation was a 
valid exercise of the police power “designed to prevent serious pub-
lic harm.”8 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Anton Scalia concluded that regulations that “den[y] all 
economically beneficial or productive use of land” are automatically 
compensable unless they inhere in the ”restrictions that background 
principles of the state’s law of property and nuisance already placed 
upon land ownership.”9 Except that the Murrs’ lots were contiguous, 
and Mr. Lucas’s were not, the Murrs’ situation was analogous. They 
argued that the lot merger regulation had exactly the prohibited ef-
fect—that is, it “depriv[ed] . . . them of ‘all, or practically all, of the 
use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate 
lot.’”10 Therefore, they asserted, citing Lucas, they were categorically 
entitled to compensation for the value of Lot E. 
The state of Wisconsin argued that the economic effect of the regu-
lation on Lot E was irrelevant because the Murrs’ no longer owned 
it separately from Lot F. The state claimed that the Murrs could not 
claim a “total taking” of their property since the regulation only 
slightly reduced the value of their property considered as a whole: 
7  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992). 
8  Id. at 1009–10.
9  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
10  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941.
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the Murrs could use, develop, and sell the merged Lot E/F. In such 
“diminishment-in-value” cases, the plaintiffs are not categorically 
entitled to compensation. Instead, courts must consider three factors 
first articulated in the 1978 case, Penn Central Transportation Company 
v. City of New York.11 These factors are: (1) “the economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant,” (2) “the extent to which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment-back expectations,” and (3) 
“the character of governmental action.”12 
Although the Penn Central factors have assumed talismanic sig-
nificance in regulatory takings cases, their precise meaning remains 
unclear—other than that they strongly favor government regula-
tions (for reasons that are not themselves self-evident). Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, their application by the lower courts resulted in 
losses for the Murrs. The trial court agreed with the state that the 
relevant parcel for purposes of takings analysis was the merged Lot 
E/F rather than Lot E individually and that the Murrs had not been 
deprived of all economic value of their property since they retained 
many options for using their property, considered as a whole. In fact, 
comparing the value of the merged lots to the lots valued separately, 
the court concluded that the merger regulations devalued the Murrs’ 
property by less than 10 percent.13 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed. It also rejected the 
Murrs’ argument that it should analyze the effect of the regulations 
on Lot E only. Instead, it held that the takings analysis was “prop-
erly focused” on the regulations’ effect “on the Murrs’ property as 
a whole,” that is, both lots together. The court concluded that the 
Murrs could not reasonably have expected to use the lots sepa-
rately after they came under common ownership because they were 
charged with knowing how the merger law would affect their devel-
opment rights. The “expectation of separate treatment became un-
reasonable,” the court concluded, “when they chose to acquire Lot E 
in 1995, after their having acquired Lot F in 1994.”14 Using this frame-
work, the court of appeals held that the merger regulations did not 
effect a taking. The court acknowledged the trial court’s finding that 
11  438 U.S. 104 (1978).
12  Id. at 124–25.
13  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1942.
14 Murr v. State of Wisconsin, 359 Wis. 2d 675 (2014), at ¶ 30 (unpublished) (per curiam).
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the regulations diminished the total value of the Murrs’ property 
(that is, Lots E and F considered together) by less than 10 percent. 
After the Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to hear the case, the 
U.S. Supreme Court granted the Murr’s petition for certiorari.
II. Murr’s Mudslide
The outcome in Murr turned on whether the Court should assess 
the effect of the challenged regulations on Lot E alone or on the lots 
considered together. The Court answered by invoking the parcel-
as-a-whole rule, first announced in Penn Central. There, the Court 
considered a regulatory takings challenge to a historic preservation 
law that prohibited the owner of New York City’s Grand Central Sta-
tion—the Penn Central Transportation Company—from erecting a 
high-rise office building above the terminal. Penn Central claimed 
that the regulation had taken 100 percent of its airspace, causing it 
to suffer a financial loss of hundreds of millions of dollars.15 The 
Court rejected the claim that the regulation confiscated the whole of 
the airspace above the terminal. It reasoned instead that the impact 
of a regulation must be measured against the regulated “parcel as 
a whole,” which, in Penn Central, was “the city tax block designated 
as the landmark site.”16 The Court characterized the historical pres-
ervation regulation as merely a use restriction on that parcel (that 
is, the ground and the air considered together). Since the regulation 
preserved Penn Central’s original “investment backed expectations” 
(to operate a railway station), the Court concluded—despite the mag-
nitude of the loss caused by the regulation—that Penn Central had 
not suffered a compensable regulatory taking.17
The parcel-as-a-whole rule seeks to prevent property owners from 
gaming the system by engaging in what Margaret Radin has called 
“conceptual severance”—that is, separating for regulatory takings 
analysis the portion of its property impacted by a regulation from the 
remaining portion that is unaffected by the challenged regulation.18 
15  Penn Central had entered into a contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars 
with a developer for the sale of the airspace, which was contingent upon securing 
regulatory permission to build a high rise above Grand Central. 
16  Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130–31.
17  Id. at 131–34.
18  Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the 
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1676 (1988). This is often referred to 
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Since, due to the Lucas holding, a property owner’s likelihood of suc-
ceeding in a regulatory takings case increases dramatically if the reg-
ulation at question effects a “total” taking, property owners have an 
incentive to define the relevant private property affected by a regula-
tion narrowly. As Chief Justice John Roberts observed in his dissent 
in Murr, “Because a regulation amounts to a taking if it completely 
destroys a property’s productive use, there is an incentive for own-
ers to define the relevant ‘private property’ narrowly. This incentive 
threatens the careful balance between property rights and govern-
ment authority that our regulatory takings doctrine strikes . . . . And 
so we do not allow it.”19 The Court has reiterated in a number of sub-
sequent cases that the impact of a challenged regulation will be mea-
sured against the regulated “parcel as a whole.” It has also made clear 
that property owners cannot claim that a regulation effects a “total 
taking” of a portion of their regulated property as long as develop-
ment is permitted on the remainder of it.20 
The difficulty in Murr, however, was that the Court had to decide 
what the relevant parcel was—Lot E or the merged Lot E/F. The Su-
preme Court had never before confronted the question of what the 
relevant “parcel” is in a takings case when the government changed 
parcel boundaries (in the Murrs’ case, by merging legally distinct 
lots). The answer to the question was critical—indeed, outcome-
determinative: Either the Murrs had lost all value of Lot E or they 
had suffered a minor reduction in value in their property considered 
as a whole. Ultimately, the Court affirmed the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals’ ruling that the relevant parcel was the merged Lot E/F. It 
as the “denominator problem” in regulatory takings law. See Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Association v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (“Because our test for regu-
latory taking requires us to compare the value that has been taken from the property to 
the value that remains in the property, one critical question is determining how to de-
fine the unit of property ‘whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.’”).
19  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1952 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
20  See Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 331 (2002) (refusing to allow property owners to “effectively sever” the 32 
months during which a regulatory moratorium prevented all development in order to 
claim that the regulation effected a “temporary total taking” of their property); Palaz-
zolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631–37 (2001) (holding that a wetlands regulation 
did not effect a total taking because development was permitted on an upland portion 
of the plaintiff’s property).
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therefore concluded that the Murrs had not suffered a regulatory 
taking. 
On its face, there is nothing earth-shattering about the Court’s 
holding in Murr. As Chief Justice Roberts observed in dissent:
The Court today holds that the regulation does not effect 
a taking that requires just compensation. This bottom-line 
conclusion does not trouble me; the majority presents a fair 
case that the Murrs can still make good use of both lots, and 
that the ordinance is a commonplace tool to preserve scenic 
areas, such as the Lower St. Croix River, for the benefit of 
land owners and the public alike.21
Unfortunately, the path that the majority took to reach this, in my 
view, erroneous conclusion effectively rewrites the law of takings 
and replaces one of the few clarifying principles in the regulatory 
takings muddle—that state laws are the source of property rights—
with a new balancing test that seeks to define the meaning of prop-
erty for the first time as a matter of federal law. That new test is sub-
jective and unpredictable, and it decidedly tips the scales in favor of 
the government, further undermining the Takings Clause’s already 
limited protection against regulatory excess. 
A. The Majority
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion began by review-
ing the Court’s regulatory takings canon, with a particular em-
phasis on the division between ad hoc and categorical review. As a 
general matter, Justice Kennedy observed, the Court has refrained 
from elaborating definitive rules that govern the analysis of takings 
claims. Instead, regulatory takings cases generally involve “ad hoc, 
factual inquiries, designed to allow careful examination and weigh-
ing all of the relevant circumstances.”22 This pattern was established 
in what is widely regarded as the Court’s first regulatory takings 
case, Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, which announced the oft-
repeated but completely unhelpful principle that “while property 
21  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
22  Id. at 1942 (majority op.) (quoting Tahoe Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322).
Cato Supreme Court Review
140
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will 
be recognized as a taking.”23 
As Justice Kennedy observed, however, the Court has over the 
years articulated a number of principles that guide the analysis of 
whether a regulation “goes too far.” Two of these principles were 
of particular relevance in Murr. The first is the rule articulated in 
Lucas: Except in certain narrow circumstances, such as nuisance 
abatement, a regulation which “denies all economically beneficial or 
productive use of land” is categorically compensable.24 The second is 
the multi-part balancing test announced in Penn Central, which ap-
plies to “partial takings” or “diminution in value” cases: “[W]hen a 
regulation impedes the use of property without depriving the owner 
of all economically beneficial use, a taking still may be found based 
on a ‘complex of factors,’” which include, “(1) the economic impact of 
the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) 
the character of the governmental action.”25 
As discussed previously, the merger rule challenged in Murr cre-
ated confusion over which rule the Court should use to analyze the 
Murrs’ regulatory takings claim: If the relevant parcel was Lot E 
alone, then the case would seem to involve a fairly straightforward 
application of the categorical prohibition on “total takings” an-
nounced in Lucas. The regulations that prevented the Murrs from 
developing or selling Lot E appeared to impose a total taking of Lot 
E, in which case the Murrs would be categorically entitled to com-
pensation. If the relevant parcel was the “merged” Lot E/F, however, 
then the regulations did not effect a total taking, since the Murrs 
retained the right to develop and sell the “merged” parcel. In other 
words, if the merger regulation expanded the relevant parcel to in-
clude both lots, considered together, then the case was transformed 
from a total-takings claim, which the Murrs should win, into a dim-
inution-in-value challenge, which the Murrs should lose. 
The Murrs argument that they had suffered a total taking of Lot 
E was made stronger by the fact that their parents had the right to 
develop or sell Lot E before the transfer. In Lucas, Justice Scalia had 
23  Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
24  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
25  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). 
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clarified that the property owners cannot challenge regulations that 
“inhere” in the “background principles of . . . property and nuisance 
already placed upon land ownership.”26 This exception to the total 
takings rule makes sense—after all, property owners cannot lose 
rights they never had. But that does not mean that the Murrs could 
not challenge the merger rule merely because they assumed owner-
ship subject to it. In fact, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals conclu-
sion to the contrary squarely conflicted with the holding in the 2001 
case Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
jected the claim that owners are barred from challenging regulations 
merely because they assume ownership subject to them. In Palazzolo, 
the plaintiff challenged wetlands regulations that prohibited him 
from developing much of his property. While the plaintiff assumed 
title to the property subject to the regulations, the previous owner 
had purchased the property before the regulations were imposed. 
The state of Rhode Island, citing Lucas, argued that the owner could 
not challenge the regulations since he knew or should have known 
about the development restrictions when he took title to the prop-
erty. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding instead that states do not 
have unfettered discretion to “shape and define property rights.”27 
In particular, the Court held that a state cannot construct legal rules 
that eliminate valid regulatory takings claims upon a transfer of 
ownership. Otherwise, the Court warned, “postenactment transfer 
of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action 
restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State 
would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings 
Clause.”28 
The Murrs’ predicament was similar to the facts in Palazzolo. After 
all, before the transfer, their parents enjoyed the right to develop 
and sell Lot E separately from Lot F. Their children lost this right 
solely because the title to the lots changed hands. Unfortunately, the 
majority in Murr did not see it this way. Instead, Justice Kennedy 
construed Palazzolo to open the door to a new federal definition of 
property, one unhinged from the Court’s previous insistence that 
state law defines the contours of property rights. Citing Palazzolo, 
26  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
27  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001).
28  Id. at 627.
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Kennedy argued that the Court has “expressed caution [about] the 
view that property rights should be coextensive with those under 
state law.”29 He warned, “defining the parcel by reference to state 
law could defeat a challenge even to a state enactment that alters 
permitted uses of property in ways inconsistent with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations.”30 
Kennedy, therefore, refused to adopt either of the “formalistic 
rules” urged by Wisconsin or the Murrs to guide the parcel in-
quiry. Wisconsin’s approach—to “tie the definition of the parcel 
to state law, considering the two lots here as a single whole due to 
their merger under the challenged regulation”—was flawed be-
cause it “simply assumes the answer to the question.” The Murrs’ 
approach—“a presumption that lot lines define the relevant parcel 
in every instance”—was flawed because it “ignored the fact that lot 
lines are themselves creatures of state law, which can be overridden 
by the State,” and because it would require the Court to “credit the 
aspect of state law that favors their preferred approach (lot lines) and 
ignore that which does not (merger provision).”31
Kennedy concluded that no single consideration could be used to 
determine the relevant parcel in a regulatory takings challenge. In-
stead, he directed courts to consider an entirely new laundry list of 
inchoate, vague factors to decide the universe of property rights af-
fected by a challenged regulation. The first consideration is the way 
that the law regulates the plaintiffs’ property. While he insisted, cit-
ing Palazzolo, that “[a] valid takings claim will not evaporate just be-
cause a purchaser took title after the law was enacted,” he also sug-
gested that “[a] reasonable restriction that predates a landowner’s 
acquisition . . . can be one of the objective factors that most landown-
ers would reasonably consider in forming fair expectations about 
their property” in light of “background customs and the whole of 
our legal tradition.”32 The second consideration is the “physical char-
acteristics of the landowner’s property,” including “the relationship 
of any distinguishable tracts, the parcel’s topography, and the sur-
rounding human and ecological environment.” He suggested that “it 
29  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1938.
30  Id. at 1943.
31  Id. at 1947.
32  Id. at 1945.
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may be relevant that the property is located in an area that is subject 
to, or likely to become subject to, environmental or other regulation.” 
The third consideration is how the challenged regulations affect not 
only the “value of the property under the challenged regulations,” 
but also “the effect of burdened land on the value of other holdings.” 
For example, he suggested, a use restriction may decrease the market 
value of the regulated property, but add value to the landowner’s 
other holdings, such as “increasing privacy, expanding recreational 
space, or preserving surrounding natural beauty.”33 Rather omi-
nously, Kennedy did not rule out the possibility that parcels that are 
clearly distinct legally under state law—including perhaps noncon-
tiguous parcels—might be considered a single parcel in a regulatory 
takings case if the regulation of one parcel added “value” (including 
nonmonetary value) to the other. 
Applying this new test, Kennedy concluded that the relevant par-
cel in the case was the “merged” Lot E/F. His reasoning was as cir-
cular and convoluted as the new test itself. First, he concluded that 
the Murrs’ property should be treated as a whole because the state 
law that they were challenging treated it as a whole (and for a good 
reason). The “treatment of the property under state and local law,” he 
concluded, “indicates petitioners’ property should be treated as one 
when considering the effects of the restrictions.” Kennedy empha-
sized the reasonableness of the merger provision, the prevalence of 
similar provisions in other states’ laws, and the public-policy goals 
that merging small lots advanced—especially the elimination of 
substandard lots to encourage orderly and rational development. He 
also concluded that the Murrs’ expectations were not unduly dis-
rupted, since they voluntarily (albeit unknowingly) submitted to the 
merger regulation by assuming common ownership of both Lot E 
and Lot F. And, he observed that a contrary holding would throw 
into question numerous other merger and boundary-alteration pro-
visions in state law, including some that allow informal adjustments 
with minimal government oversight.34 Second, he opined that the 
Murrs should have expected their property to be regulated because it 
was the kind of property that often is regulated. The “physical char-
acteristics of the property support its treatment as a unified parcel,” 
33  Id. at 1945–46.
34  Id. at 1948.
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he concluded, because the lots’ “rough terrain and narrow shape 
make it reasonable to expect their range of potential uses might be 
limited.”35 He also opined, citing the history of land use regulation in 
the Lower St. Croix River area, that the lots’ location along the river 
should have put the Murrs on notice that their property was likely 
to be regulated. Third, he concluded that the “prospective value that 
Lot E brings to Lot F supports considering the two as one parcel.” He 
reasoned that the restriction on selling or developing Lot E was “mit-
igated by the benefits of using the property as an integrated whole, 
allowing increased privacy and recreational space, plus the optimal 
location of any improvements.”36 
Weighing the impact of the regulation against the totality of the 
Murrs’ property, not surprisingly, resulted in a government victory. 
The majority concluded that the Murrs had not suffered a compen-
sable taking: They were not categorically entitled to compensation 
under Lucas because the regulations had not deprived them of all 
the value of the combined parcels. And, they were not entitled to 
compensation under the Penn Central balancing factors because the 
regulation had, at most, minimally reduced the value of the parcels 
considered together. Indeed it was possible that the merger regula-
tions increased the overall value of the Murrs’ property.37
B. The Dissent 
As noted previously, Chief Justice Roberts began his dissent by 
observing that he had no particular objection to the majority’s hold-
ing that the merger regulation did not effect a taking of the Murrs’ 
property. His dissent focused on the majority’s decision to replace 
the presumption that state laws define the contours of property 
rights, which the Takings Clause in turn secures, with a new multi-
factor, takings-specific federal definition of property. “Our decisions 
have, time and again, declared that the Takings Clause protects pri-
vate property rights as state law creates and defines them,” Roberts 
argued. “By securing such established property rights, the Takings 
Clause protects individuals from being forced to bear the full weight 
of actions that should be borne by the public at large. The majority’s 
35  Id.
36  Id.
37  Id. at 1949–50.
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new malleable definition of ‘private property’—adopted solely ‘for 
purposes of th[e] takings inquiry’—undermines that protection.”38 
The chief justice asserted that the Court should have adhered to 
the traditional approach, which relied on state law to define the 
boundaries of private property, and treated the question of whether 
the challenged regulation effected a taking as a separate issue. The 
Takings Clause, he urged, raises three distinct questions about regu-
latory action: The first is “what ‘private property’ the government’s 
planned course of conduct will affect.” The second is “whether that 
property has been ‘taken for public use.’” And, if so, third, what com-
pensation is due? 
Murr was a “step one” case, which required the Court to identify 
the property interest at stake. Because the Takings Clause does not 
define “property,” this first inquiry “requires looking outside the 
Constitution” to sources such as state law.39 Admittedly, Roberts ob-
served, the “enigmatic” parcel-as-a-whole rule “has created confu-
sion about how to identify the relevant property in a regulatory tak-
ings case when the claimant owns more than one lot of land. Should 
the impact of the regulation be evaluated with respect to each indi-
vidual lot, or with respect to the adjacent lots grouped together as 
one unit?”40 Clearly, this “confusion” was at the heart of the dispute 
in Murr. But Roberts correctly faulted the majority’s conclusion that 
the answer to the question “what is the relevant parcel?” requires 
a new federal definition of property. He urged a more “straightfor-
ward” approach: “State laws define the boundaries of distinct units 
of land, and those boundaries should, in all but the most exceptional 
circumstances, determine the parcel at issue.”41 Roberts rejected the 
majority’s conclusion that reliance on state law to determine the con-
tours of property rights creates an excessive risk of “gamesmanship.” 
He reasoned, “States create property rights with respect to particu-
lar ‘things.’ And in the context of real property, those ‘things’ are 
horizontally bounded lots of land.” Given this reality, he reasoned, 
courts are perfectly capable of sussing out strategic efforts to com-
bine (on the part of states) or divide (on the part of property owners) 
38  Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
39  Id. at 1951.
40  Id. at 1952.
41  Id. at 1953.
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parcels to enhance the likelihood of succeeding in a regulatory tak-
ings case. 
Roberts further criticized the majority for conflating the first in-
quiry in a takings case (determining the relevant universe of prop-
erty rights at issue), with the second inquiry (determining whether 
a taking has occurred). In deciding that Lots E and F were a single 
parcel, as Roberts observed, the majority considered factors (such 
as the owners’ regulatory expectations and the public-policy goals 
advanced by the regulations) that are irrelevant to the determination 
of the contours of the regulated property. These factors are properly 
considered after that determination has been made, when a court 
must decide whether a taking has occurred. By “cramming [these 
considerations] into the definition of ‘private property,’” Roberts 
warned, the majority “undermines the effectiveness of the Takings 
Clause as a check on the government’s power to shift the cost of pub-
lic life onto private individuals.”42 As Roberts observed, while it is 
true that regulatory takings inquiries are usually ad hoc, the takings 
inquiry “presuppos[es] that the ‘relevant private property’ has al-
ready been identified.” He continued, “while ownership of contigu-
ous parcels may bear on whether a person’s plot has been ‘taken,’ 
Penn Central provides no basis for disregarding state property lines 
when identifying the ‘parcel as a whole.’”43 
The majority’s decision to depart from state property principles to 
determine the scope of the Murrs’ property rights, Roberts urged, 
opens the door to precisely the kind of gamesmanship that suppos-
edly motivated the majority’s decision to adopt a federal constitu-
tional definition of property. “Whenever possible, governments in 
regulatory takings cases will ask courts to aggregate legally distinct 
properties into one ‘parcel’ solely for purposes of resisting a particu-
lar claim.” And since the majority’s new definition of the parcel-as-a-
whole turns in part on the reasonableness of the regulation at issue, 
the government’s interest unfortunately will come into play twice—
both when identifying the relevant parcel and when determining 
whether the regulatory burden is so excessive as to constitute a 
taking.44 “The result,” Roberts worried, “is clear double counting to 
42  Id. at 1954.
43  Id.
44  Id. at 1955.
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tip the scales in favor of the government: Reasonable government 
regulation should have been anticipated by the landowner, so the 
relevant parcel is defined consistent with that regulation.” What’s 
more, “In deciding whether there is a taking under the second step 
of the analysis, the regulation will seem eminently reasonable given 
its impact on the pre-packaged parcel. Not, as the Court assures us, 
‘necessarily’ in ‘every’ case, but surely in most.”45 Thus, the major-
ity’s “new framework compromises the Takings Clause as a barrier 
between individuals and the press of the public interest.”46
Roberts concluded by analyzing the Murrs’ takings claim under 
the traditional approach, which looks to state law to determine the 
contours of the property rights at issue. In his view, the case was 
a relatively straightforward one. Faulting the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals for, much like the majority, adopting a “takings-specific 
approach to defining the relevant parcel,” he argued that the case 
should be remanded to determine whether Lots E and F are legally 
distinct parcels using “ordinary principles of Wisconsin property 
law.”47 At that point, after the court determines the relevant par-
cel, the real work of determining whether a taking had occurred—
a necessarily fact-intensive task requiring the exercise of reasoned 
judgment—would properly begin. But, he admonished, “basing the 
definition of ‘property’ on a judgment call, too, allows the govern-
ment’s interests to warp the private rights that the Takings Clause is 
supposed to secure.”48 
C. Remediating Murr’s Mudslide
Chief Justice Roberts is undoubtedly correct that all private prop-
erty owners, not just the members of the Murr family, lost in the Murr 
case. For the reasons set forth in his dissent, the majority’s multifac-
tor redefinition of private property undermines the Fifth Amend-
ment’s already limited protection against expropriative regulations. 
In the future, courts and regulators alike will undoubtedly read Murr 
as an invitation to reject regulatory takings claims challenging the 
high costs imposed by regulations that purport to advance the public 
45  Id. at 1955–56. 
46  Id. at 1956.
47  Id.
48  Id. at 1957.
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interest. There is a serious risk that Murr transforms the Court’s prior 
admonition that the Takings Clause exists to prevent the government 
from “forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole” into 
mere hortatory fluff.49 The factors that the opinion requires courts to 
apply to define the property rights at issue in a regulatory takings 
case are not only vague and subjective; they also favor government 
regulators over property owners since they import public policy con-
siderations into the definition of private property itself. Essentially, to 
answer the question “what property does the plaintiff own?” courts 
must now engage in guesswork about whether a plaintiff should have 
anticipated a regulation and weigh the owner’s loss against the public 
policy goals of a challenged regulation. Those factors ought to be ir-
relevant to determining the scope of ownership rights. 
The chief justice also is right that a continued reliance on state 
laws to define the contours of property rights would have averted 
the Murr mudslide. The traditional approach would have been 
vastly preferable to the constitutional detour taken by the majority. 
But Roberts overestimates the extent to which relying on state laws 
to define property rights clarifies the takings muddle. For the rea-
sons discussed previously, the question posed in Murr is endemic 
to the takings puzzle: If state laws secure property rights, why can 
they also violate them? Commentators have faulted Justice Scalia 
for misapprehending in Lucas the nature of “background principles 
of property and nuisance”—by assuming that these principles are 
fixed and static when in fact they are fluid and evolving.50 Chief 
Justice Roberts similarly is too sanguine that there are sufficiently 
fixed “ordinary principles” of state property law to resolve contested 
questions about the nature and extent of property rights affected by 
a challenged regulation. After all, the Wisconsin courts purported to 
apply settled Wisconsin law in holding that the Murrs’ lots should be 
considered one parcel, yet Roberts faulted them for adopting a “tak-
ings specific” definition of property. It is unclear what in the nature 
of “ordinary principles” of state property law prevents state courts 
from adopting such a definition, or, for that matter, any definition. 
49  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
50  Louis A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can’t Undo the Takings Muddle, 28 Ind. 
L. Rev. 329 (1995); William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1393 
(1993).
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And, while reliance on state law will lend more certainty in many 
takings cases—for example, the fact that the Murrs held separate 
title to Lots E and F and paid separate tax bills strongly suggests 
that the lots should be treated as legally distinct—it will not alone 
protect property owners from malleable rules that favor regulators. 
Moreover, even if state law provides a satisfactorily stable definition 
of property rights, the takings inquiry in diminution-in-value cases 
will continue to turn on the application of the elusive Penn Central 
factors, which themselves tip the scale in favor of regulators over 
property owners.
In his separate dissent in Murr, Justice Clarence Thomas ques-
tioned the wisdom of the entire regulatory-takings doctrine. He sug-
gested that “it would be desirable for us to take a fresh look at our 
regulatory takings jurisprudence, to see whether it can be grounded 
in the original public meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.”51 In my view, Justice Thomas is correct that 
a historically grounded “fresh look” is the only principled way to 
clear the takings muddle. Murr further muddies the takings waters, 
but the entire doctrine has long been riddled with inconsistencies 
and relies more on ipse dixit assertions than reasoned analysis. The 
parcel-as-a-whole rule is a case in point. It is not at all clear why 
the proportion of an owner’s loss resulting from a regulation should 
matter more to the Court than the magnitude of the loss. For ex-
ample, if a rancher owning 1,000 acres was prevented by an environ-
mental regulation from using 100 of them for any purpose, he would 
probably lose a regulatory takings challenge. But if he owned only 
the 100 regulated acres, then he might well win one (unless the regu-
lation fell under Lucas’s narrow nuisance exception). Yet the regula-
tory burden is the same.52 
Thomas did not elucidate what a rigorous historical analysis of the 
original public meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
might reveal about the regulatory takings problem. Many scholars 
have suggested that the Takings Clause as originally understood 
51  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52  See David A. Dana, Why Do We Have the Parcel-as-a-Whole Rule? 39 Vt. L. Rev. 
617 (2015); Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings: One Distinction Too 
Many, 64 Stan. L. Rev. Online 99 (2012).
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provided no protection against regulatory takings at all.53 I am a 
skeptic of this claim.54 Even if I am wrong—and I am admittedly in 
the minority—Thomas suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause may provide an alternative source 
of protection against regulatory excesses. Scholars have demon-
strated that, by the antebellum period, courts had begun to develop 
a fairly robust jurisprudence delineating the line between valid and 
expropriative regulations.55 These jurisprudential concepts might 
have found a home in the Privileges or Immunities Clause had it not 
been eviscerated in the Slaughter House Cases.56 It is unclear whether 
analyzing problems like the one posed in Murr under the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause, as properly understood, would lend greater 
clarity to the regulatory takings issue. But it is hard to imagine that it 
could compound the confusion any more than current law does. Un-
fortunately, since Thomas appears to be alone in his curiosity about 
the matter, the takings waters likely will remain muddied for the 
foreseeable future. 
53  John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings 
Doctrine, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1252, 1252 (1996); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early 
Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. Rev. 1099 
(2000); Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782 (1995).
54  Nicole Stelle Garnett, “No Taking without a Touching?’” Questions from an Arm-
chair Originalist, 45 San Diego L. Rev. 761 (2008).
55  Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1549 (2003).
56  Michael Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory Takings: Why the Fifth Amend-
ment May Not Protect against Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth Amendment 
May, 45 San Diego L. Rev. 729 (2008).
